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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
RALPH V. BACKMAN,
Plaintiff,

vs ..
E. ALLEN BATEMAN, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SALT
LAKE CITY, a municipal corporation,

Case No.
8052

Defendants.

MATHIAS C. TANNER,
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No.
E. ALLEN BATEMAN, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF OGDEN CITY, a municipal corporation.

8064

Defendants.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The two above entitled cases have been consolidated
by an order of the court for purposes of briefs and oral
argument. The cases differ in factual detail ; the legal
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issues, however, are identical, with the exception of one
additional problem posed in the Tanner case which will be
the subject of Point III of this brief.
/

Before this brief went to the printers, counsel for
plaintiffs furnished to counsel for defendants a draft of
the statement of facts which plaintiffs intended to incorporate in their brief. The statement was accurate and complete; although many of the details appear not to be essential to a determination of the legal issues in this case.
Defendants concede the factual accuracy of both the plaintiffs' pleadings and the brief, but are in disagreement with
plaintiffs as to the legal conclusions which follow. In the
Backman Case, plaintiff is the principal of a Salt Lake
City High School who was denied re-employment because
of a ruling by defendant Bateman that such employment
would be a violation of Utah's "anti-nepotism" statutes
(Ch. 3, Title 52, U. C. A. 1953, as amended by Ch. 79,
Laws of Utah 1953), plaintiff being a brother to a member of the Salt Lake City Board of Education who is also
chairman of the Board. In the Tanner Case, plaintiff, a
teacher of biology, was denied re-employment in the Ogden
City High School for the reason that his brother was a
member of the Board. An additional fact in the Tanner
Case is that the Ogden City Board of Education has heretofore resolved, in accordance with statutes giving it that
power, that the office of board member should be uncompensated.
The only questions involved i:p. this appeal are whether
the anti-nepotism statute is constitutional, and if so wheth~ __
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er its correct construction makes it applicable to these
plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE STATUTE IS A VALID EXERCISE OF
THE STATE'S POLICE POWER.

POINT II.
THE STATUTE IS APPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFFS.
POINT III.
THE FACT THAT THE OGDEN CITY BOARD
MEMBERS RECEIVE NO COMPENSATION IS
WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT IN THIS CASE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE STATUTE IS A VALID EXERCISE OF
THE STATE'S POLICE POWER.
The statute in question now reads :
"52-3-1. It is unlawful for any person holding
any position the compensation for which is paid out
of public funds to retain in employment or to employ, appoint, or vote for the appointment of, his or
her father, mother, husband, wife, son, daughter,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first
cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law,
sister-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law in or
to any position or employment, when the salary,
wages, pay or compensation of such appointee is to
be paid out of any public funds; and it is unlawful
for such appointee to accept or to retain such employment in all cases where the direct power of employment or appointment to such position is or can
be exercised by any person within the degrees of
consanguinity or affinity herein specified, or by a
board or group of which such person is a member.
"52-3-2. Each day any such person, father,
mother, husband, wife, son, daughter, sister, brother,
uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first cousin, mother-inlaw, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-i:Q.-law, sonin-law, or daughter-in-law, is retained in office by
any of said officials shall be regarded as a separate
offense.
"52-3-3. Any person violating any of the provisions of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor.
"52-3-4. In towns, this chapter shall not apply
to the employment of uncles, aunts, nephews, nieces
or cousins."
The pleadings of plaintiffs urge that the statute is unconstitutional. Defendants answer that the statute is a
valid exercise of the police power inherent in the government of this state.
A recent text has this to say about the nature of the
police power (16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, Sec. 175a):
"The police power is an inherent attribute of
sovereignty, and exists without any reservation in
the constitution, being founded on the duty of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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state to protect its citizens and provide for the safety and good order of society. In its nature it is
broad and comprehensive, and the laws enacted for
the purpose of regulation thereunder may be impolitic, harsh, and oppressive without contravening
the constitutional inhibition. It corresponds to the
right of self-preservation in the individual, and is an
essential element in all orderly governments, because necessary to the proper maintenance of the
government and the general welfare of the community. It comprehends reasonable preventive measures
no less than the punishment of perpetrated offenses.
On it depends the security of social order, the life
and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence
in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of
private and social life, and the beneficial use of
property, and it has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests. It has for its
object the improvement of social and economic conditions affecting the community at large and collectively with a view of bringing about 'the greatest
good of the greatest number.' It is founded largely
on. the maxim, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,
an<t also to some extent on that other maxim of
public policy, Salus populi suprema lex. The constitution presupposes the existence of the police
power and is to be construed with reference to that
fa~t, and police regulations presuppose conditions
which, unless controlled, will operate to a public
disadvantage."
Defendants concede, as of course they must, that the
police power of a state is not without limits. Those limits
are drawn, so far as this case is concerned, by the due
process clauses in the federal and state constitutions. With
respect to the problem of this interrelation between the
police power and the due process clause the following quoSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tation is taken from 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, Sec.
261,p.997:
"In discussing the relationship between the
guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
police power of the states, Justice Holmes has pointed out: 'We must be cautious about pressing the
broad words of the Fourteenth Amendment to a
drily logical extreme. Many laws which it would be
vain to ask the court to overthrow could be shown,
easily enough, to transgress a scholastic interpretation of one or another of the great guaranties in
the Bill of Rights. They more or less limit the lib~
erty of the individual, or they diminish property to
a certain extent. We have few scientifically certain
criteria of ·legislation, and as it is often difficult to
mark the line where what is called the police power
of the states is limited by the Constitution of the
United States, judges should be slow to read into the
latter a nolumus mutare as against the lawmaking
power. (citing Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.
S. 104, 55 L. Ed. 112, 31 S. Ct. 186, 32 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 1062)".
Another principle of constitutional law is relevant here.
Many cases indicate the necessity of judicial restraint in
adjudicating upon statutes passed under the police power.
Large discretion is of necessity vested in the legislature in
determining what measures ought to be passed in furtherance of the public welfare. Cases written by this courf
teach that it is not a function of the courts to inquire into
legislative wisdom. In State v .. Packer Corporation, 77 Utah
500, 297 P. 1013, the court sustained the validity of a statute which prohibited the advertisement of cigarettes upon
billboards. The decision contains this language:
"It is well settled in this state, and elsewhere,
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that the courts will not declare a statute unconstitutional unless it clearly and manifestly violates
some provision of the Constitution of the state or of
the United States. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of an act,
and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of its
validity. Utah State Fair Ass'n. v. Green, 68 Utah
251, 249 P. 1016. The whole burden lies on him who
denies the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 436, 6 L. Ed.
678.
"* * * 'Only in cases, however, where the
legislature exceeds its powers, will the courts inter
fere or set up their judgment against that of thb
legislature. Where the act has a real and. substantial
relation to the police power, then no matter how unreasonable nor how unwise the measure itself may
be, it is not for the judicial tribunals to avoid or
vacate it upon constitutional grounds, nor will the
courts assume to determine whether the measures
are wise, or the best that might have been adopted;
or whether such laws are invalid on the ground of
inexpediency, or whether they bear any real or substantial relation to the public welfare'."
The same statute was again before the court with the
same result, 78 Utah 177, 2 P. 2d 114, and the cases were
affirmed by the United States Supreme Court "in Packer
Corporation v. Utah, 285 U. S. 105, 52 S. Ct. 273, 76 L. Ed.
643, 79 A. L. R. 564. A more recent case, S~ate v. Mason,
94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 920, upheld the constitutionality of a
statute which imposed license requirements upon all commission merchants taking possession of farm produce without paying cash. The case contained this thoughtful language regarding the relationship of the police power to the
due process cia use :
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"It is urged that the act bears no relation to
public health, morals or the general welfare of the
State, the implication from the argument being
that the power of the legislature in an act of this
sort must fall under such classification. * * *
What defendant apparently has in mind is that, in
determining what is or what is not due process as
it affects the ordinary rights which citizens of all
orderly governments enjoy, we generally look to
see whether the legislation which affects or trammels those rights is reasonably related to and designed to protect the health, safety, morals, or public welfare of the people or any portion of them. This
balance between police powers and due process is,
therefore, more or less in a state of unstable equilibrium, changing with sociological and economic
developments. As the protection of the due process
clause recedes, the police power advances. There is
always articulation between the two."
Other cases involving the police power are: Utah
Mfrs.' Assn. v. Stewart, 82 Utah 198, 23 P. 2d 229; Broadbent et al. v. Gibson et al., 105 Utah 53, 140 P. 2d 439,
Holden v. Hardy, 14 Utah 71, affirmed 169 U. S. 366, 42
L. Ed. 780. And of course there are many cases based upon
the well-settled proposition that all presumptions favor constitutionality: Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 P. 272,
12 A. L. R. 552; State v. Sopher, 25 Utah 318, 71 P. 482, 60
L. R. A. 468.
Any state obviously has an immediate concern in the
employment practices of its own employees. As was said
by McKenna, J., in Atkin v. Kansas (1903) 191 U. S.
207:
"It belongs to the state as the guardian of its
people and having control of its affairs to prescribe
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the conditions upon which it will permit public work
to be done in its behalf, or on behalf of its municipalities."
Inherent in any government, then, is a broad power
over its employees. A striking example of the breadth of
this power is found in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,
330 U. S. 75, 91 L. Ed 754, involving the constitutionality
of the Hatch Act. That statute forbade employees of the
executive branch of the federal government from taking
"any active part in political management or in political
campaigns."
Now, interference with the basic political rights of a
citizen is a grave and severe exercise of governmental power
-much more so than that involved here. And the wisdom
of the Hatch Act was and is hotly controversial. Yet the Act
was upheld. The worker involved, Mr. Poole, was a skilled
coin roller in aU. S. Mint, and the possibility of his unfair
use of governmental prestige for political purposes would
seem remote. In the majority opinion is a footnote (34)
which is relevant to that case and to the one at bar (91 L.
Ed., at 772) :
"When in 1891 New Bedford, Mass., under a
rule removed a policeman for political activity, an
opinion by Mr. Justice, then Judge, Holmes disposed
summarily of McAulliffe's contention that the rule
invaded his right to express his political opinion with
the epigram, 'The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.' McAulliffe v. New
Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N. E. 517."
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Nepotism has widely been regarded as harmful to the
conduct of an efficient system of public employment. It
would seem to follow that nepotism is a valid subject upon
which a state may legislate. One case which so holds is
Barton v. Alexander, 27 Ida. 286, 148 P. 471, which upheld
the validity of the Idaho anti-nepotism statute as being a
valid subject of police action. The Idaho court said:
"We believe it to be within the legislative power
to prohibit officers from appointing persons to office related to them by affinity or consanguinity, in
the interest of efficiency in public service and for
the best interests of the people and of the municipal
subdivisions of the state, and as a legitimate police
regulation in regard to which the lawmaking power
may legislate, and reasonable legislation in regard
thereto is constitutional and enforceable. Nepotism
is recognized as an evil that ought to be eradicated
and stamped out, and we know of nothing in the
state constitution that prohibits the legislature from
passing reasonable regulations in regard thereto."
Anti-nepotism statutes have a firm basis, therefore,
in the sovereign police power of the state.· Many states have
statutes prohibiting nepotism in school district employment
practices. Examples of these statutes are:
Ariz. Code Annotated 19B9, Sec. 54-416 (3) ;
General Statutes of Kansas Annotated 1949,
Sec. 17-1347;
Miss. Code 1942 Annotated, Sec. 6302;
Oklahoma Statutes Annotated 21-481.
In Arkansas there is a provision that one cannot be
appointed as a teacher if he is related to a board member
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unless the teacher is elected by petition of 507o of the patrons of the school involved.
Ark. Statutes 1947 Annotated, Sec. 80-509 (d-a).
In some states, school teachers are expressly excepted
from the operation of the state's nepotism law:
Code of Iowa 1950, Sec. 71.1;
New Mexico Statutes 1941 Annotated, Sec. 10.:.
110.
In other states the employment of a teacher related to
a board member may validly be affected if the board member disqualifies himself from participation in the vote.
Idaho Code (1947 Ida. Code Commission) Sec.
33-714 (14) ;
Missouri Revised Statutes 1949, Sec. 163.080.
The above list of statutes does not purport to be complete. Indexing of nepotism statutes in the various code
compilations is not standardized. The reason for citing the
statutes is to show that the practice of nepotism in school
districts is a subject upon which the legislatures of several
states have seen fit to act.
It has been shown above that the practice of nepotism
in schools is one which the .legislature may suppress. The
constitutional question of this lawsuit- is whether this particular statute could resasonably have been considered by
the legislature as tending to accomplish its purpose.
An Anti-nepotism statute has been on the Utah statute
boo~s since 1931. For over 20 years the statute read:
\

"52-3-1. It is unlawful for any executive, legislative, ministerial or judicial officer of this state or
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any of its political subdivisions to retain in employment or to employ, appoint, or vote for the appoint~
ment of, his or her father, mother, husband, wife
son, daughter, sister, brother, uncle, aunt, nephew'
niece, first cousin, mother-in-law, father-in-law'
brother-in-law, sister-in-law, son-in-law, or daugh~
ter-in-law, in any department of the state, or of a
district, county, city or municipal government of
which such executive, legislative, ministerial or
judicial officer is a member, when the salary, wages,
pay or compensation of such appointee is to be paid
out of any public funds."
This prior statute has no effect where the hiring power
was in a board since under it the board could employ a rela~
tive of any board member, the board member simply refraining from any participation in the vote necessary to
affect the hiring. The rather wide extent to which this
practice has been indulged in school district employment
policies is disclosed by the pleadings. The same practices
are available to city councils and county commissioners.
Evidently a majority of the members of the 30th Legislature decided that, as between board members and employees, the existence of close blood or marriage ties was
not desirable. Whether or not this legislative decision was
a wise one does not of course have anything to do with these
lawsuits. The only question is whether the decision which
the legislators made could have been reached on any rational
basis.
There are well known factors upon which the legislature may have based this conclusion. Some of th€se factors
are: (1) As between two co-workers, one of whom is re-
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lated to a board member, frictions and jealousies are more
likely. There may exist suspicion, justifiable or not, of
some minor preference or advancement in any one of hundreds of ways; (2) public employment, being as it is a matter
of public concern, necessarily draws public comment. There
is plainly a greater likelihood of public criticism and lack
of public confidence in a system honeyco:r;nbed with relatives working for relatives. The above are only suggested
as factors which the legislature validly may have considered.
Other such factors may, and doubtless to exist and also were
considered. This brief is not concerned with a defense of
the wisdom of the recent amendment. Wise or not, the law
was put upon our statute books by the department of our
'
government to which the duty of writing laws is delegated
by our constitution. Plaintiffs ask that this court set aside ·
that policy determination. They ask, in effect, a repeal of
the statute.
The only case upon which plaintiffs can place reliance
.for their contention that the statute is unconstitutional is
the Florida case of State ex rel Robinson v. Keefe, ... Fla .
. . . J 149 So. 638.
That case held quite correctly that the
Florida anti-nepotism statute plainly did not, in terms,
cover the employment of school teachers. The case goes on
to imply, however, by a dictum that had the statute been
intended to apply to school teachers it would have been
unconstitutional. The dictum is, we think, not correct for
the reasons outlined above. There are many decisions which
have concerned themselves with nepotism statutes as applied to school teachers. See Quattlebaum v. Busbea, 204
Ark. 96, 162 S. W. 2d 44; State v. _School District No. 13
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(Mont. 1944), 151 P. 2d 168; State ex rel. McKittrick v.
Whittle, ... Mo .... , 63 S. W. 2d 100, 88 A. L. R. 1099.
In none of these cases is the question squarely presented
whether nepotism laws constitutionally can be applied to
school teachers. Implicit in each case, however, is the assumption that the court is d~aling with a valid law.

POINT II.
THE STATUTE IS APPLICABLE TO PLAINTIFFS.
By their pleadings, plaintiffs contend that the language of the statute does not include employment such as
theirs.
It seems plain that it does. The statute, by its own
terms, covers any employment compensated out of public
funds. The money which goes to pay school teachers' salaries is money raised by taxation, which comes within the
category of public funds. Plaintiffs doubtless will cite the
Florida case, State ex rel Robinson v. Keefe, ... Fla.... ,
149 So. 638, as an instance in wp.ich the nepotism statute
was held not to apply to school teachers. That case held
that the Florida statute did not cover school teachers. The
language of the statute there construed read as follows :
"Section 1. That any officer, member of state
board, county officer, member of county board or
commission, city official, or his appointee, who shall
knowingly employ either directly or indirectly any
person related within the fourth degree, either by
consanguinity or affinity to such state officer, memSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ber of state board, county officer, member of county
board or commission, city official or his appointee,
shall be deemed guilty of misfeasance and malfeasance in office and subject to removal therefor. Provided however that the provisions of this Act shall
not apply to officers above who employ only one person related to him as above set out.
School teachers and school principals simply do not
come within that language, and that is all the case holds.
It is plain that the Florida legislature did not contemplate
any effect upon the employment of school teachers; it is
equally plain that the Utah legislature had such an intention.
Plaintiffs plead that the anti-nepotism statute is contradictory to Sec. 53-2-15, U. C. A. 1953, which provides
that a certificate issued by the State Board of Education is
valid in any school district.
This argument is not sound. If inconsistency indeed
exists; and if the two statutes cannot possibly be harmonized, the recent anti-nepotism amendment, being later in
time, prevails. 58 Am. Jur., p. 540-541. The more obvious
answer, of course, is that there is not the slightest inconsistency. That fact that a teacher cannot lawfully be employed by a given school district does not make invalid his
teaching certificate, even in that district. His certificate is
valid. Certification by the state board is no guarantee of
a job in any district a certified teacher might decide to offer
his services to. If there is any interpretation by which two
statutes can both operate, that is the one the courts will
\
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follow. Lagoon Jo,ckey Club v. Davis County, 72 Utah 405,
270 P. 543.

POINT III.
THE FACT THAT THE OGDEN CITY BOARD
MEMBERS RECEIVE NO COMPENSATION IS
WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT IN THIS CASE.
In this Point is considered the question whether the
fact that the members of the Ogden City Board of Education
are not compensated is of any materiality. The defendants
submit that the plain wording of the statute demonstrates
that this does not matter. The only question along that line
is whether the teacher (plaintiff Tanner) is compensated
out of public funds. The case is very clearly covered by the
second clause of Sec. 52-3-1, U. C. A. 1953, as amended.
The construction of the statute which defendants submit is
the only reasonable construction is :

"*

* * ; and it is unlawful for such appointee
to accept * * * such employment [i. e., any
that is compensated out of public funds] in all cases
where the direct power of employment to such position is or can be exercised by any person within the
degrees of consanguinity or affinity herein specified,
or by a board or group of which such person is a
member.

CONCLUSION
Defendants urge that the statute here under attack is
well within the police power possessed by the legislature.
The statute, by its express terms, squarely covers the fac-
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tual situations presented by the cases of these plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs' suit is but an appeal to this court to do what
this court cannot do--repeal a statute.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
JOHN W. HORSLEY,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

